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Spelling out amnesia, 
or “forgetting me on the pretext of understanding me” 
 
 
Apostolos Lampropoulos 
 
 
To P. T.-L. 
 
In the middle of the famous madeleine story recounted in the first volume of Remembrance of Things 
Past, Proust says: 
 
When from a long-distant past nothing subsists, after the people are dead, after the things are broken and 
scattered, still, alone, more fragile, but with more vitality, more unsubstantial, more persistent, more 
faithful, the smell and taste of things remain poised a long time, like souls, ready to remind us, waiting and 
hoping for their moment, amid the ruins of all the rest; and bear unfaltering, in the tiny and almost 
impalpable drop of their essence, the vast structure of recollection. (37) 
 
Smell and taste are described here as the last and most persistent remnants of memory; they are 
fragments of a lived past that, albeit lost for good, is deeply rooted in the body and (im)patiently 
awaits the moment of its reemergence. Notwithstanding its instantaneousness and flimsiness, 
sensorial experience manages to outlive the death of people and the vanishing of objects that 
inhabited this past. More than mere retentiveness, it is a paradoxical reminder that can affect the 
praxis of memory, and, potentially, become the basis of “the vast structure of recollection.” Sensorial 
experience can set in motion a firsthand nostalgia and ground the melancholic reflection on what is no 
longer there, as well as on the distance that a subject has, often laboriously, gained from its own past. 
At a first glance, smell and taste are too weak (“still, alone, more fragile”) to placate a desire or cure a 
wound; but they are also haunting enough (“like souls”) to symptomatically indicate what would have 
been possible but did not materialise as a possibility. In this way, they conjugate a future anterior, but 
do so only as a mutter; and if “unsubstantial” smell and taste sustain the traces of memory, they 
equally moderate its surfacing, binding it to a specific here-and-now. But if the madeleine episode, 
emblematic of what a tiny sensorial detail can do, gave rise to eight volumes on the poetics of memory, 
what would its absence mean? What would happen if the ocean of such details was all of a sudden 
erased? What could a kiss signify without the aftertaste of a Benson & Hedges cigarette? (Montandon 
42-63) What connotations would “homeland” have for someone from southern Greece if it was not 
marked by the “thin skin touched with fuzz” covering the peaches known as “Aphrodite’s breast”? 
(Seremetakis 1) What kind of intellectual work could be done on eros without some drops of a 
Concentré d’orange verte mapping the smellscape of a lover’s body? (Porteous 92-94) What would 
follow if even the sensorial experience as the last remnant of memory was missing? Would there be a 
silence due to the fading of any possible memory, the unpromising pursuit of a recovery, or a 
‘disembodied’ discourse based on anything but memory? 
 
I think this is precisely the point where the question of amnesia occurs. Lacking even the most basic 
links to a past, amnesia could be seen as the return to or a quest for a state of unconditionality. 
Accordingly, talking about it might sound like an impossible and necessary task: impossible, because 
no empathy with the condition of the amnesiac is conceivable, whether such empathy would be useful 
or not; necessary, because it is perhaps the only way to approach the dubious potential of utter 
forgetting. Amnesia would then be placed beyond an inevitable and useful forgetting that can heal and 
make space for new memories and it would be nothing like a forgetting as “loss of a limitless phonetic 
arsenal [which] is the price a child must pay for the papers that grant him citizenship in the 
community of a single tongue” (Heller-Roazen 11), that is to say, a forgetting that enables one to 
speak. But, then, one could focus on amnesia in its extremity to experiment with the suppression of a 
number of certainties which have marked the landscape of contemporary thought. For example, one 
could explore a missing sense of historicity (the incapacity to place oneself in a hic et nunc), a rootless 
and errant identity (as a consequence of one’s detachment from any origin and belonging), or a 
radical, even though unilateral and ephemeral, negation of norms. Amnesia could then become the 
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sound proof chamber where the obvious and the understandable will be reconsidered, and 
comfortable thinking habits will be called into question. Moreover, even if amnesia is automatically 
added to the conceptual stock of memory studies, squeezed between overworked yet significant topics 
such as memory, forgetting, renegotiations of the past and historiography as fiction, one should be 
cautious about both its capacity to challenge their interrelationship and its frequent disappearance 
from relevant debates, as Markidou and I argue in our introduction to this issue. 
 
My working hypothesis is that neither should amnesia’s intelligibility be taken for granted nor should 
amnesia be carelessly classified as another impossible concept labeled as such before its latent 
dynamics is painstakingly unfolded. In what follows, the main question that I will try to address is 
whether amnesia fits the pattern of those Derridean concepts for which the impossible is a 
“constitutive feature” (Attridge 54)—such as the gift, responsibility, decision, love, the event, and 
hospitality. My approach will rely on the strategy of reconsidering and defamiliarising quotidian 
concepts through the lens of impossibility, a tactics that has proved to be embarrassing to those “who 
resist [Derrida’s] thought because it pushes them beyond the point where they feel comfortable” 
(Attridge 56). If this adds both to the clarity with which one can perceive a concept and to the 
feasibility of its political implementation, and if this is why, according to Derrida, “deconstruction 
loses nothing from admitting that it is impossible” (Acts 328), I will try to see in what sense amnesia 
can facilitate the passage from the desired impossible of deconstruction to the imperative possible of 
politics, and transform the impossible into a solid basis for the possible. In other words, I will attempt 
to see what the “imaginative grammar” of amnesia will be and how it can be seen as “the place of what 
to come” (Karavanta and Morgan 332). In order to do so, I propose a symptomatic reading of amnesia 
through three films: Jean Pierre Jeunet’s Un long dimanche de fiançailles (2004), Gabriel Le Bomin’s 
Les Fragments d’Antonin (2006), and Christopher Nolan’s Memento (2000). The choice of the films 
was based not only on the fact that they are among the most well-known ones explicitly engaging with 
the issue of amnesia, but also on the fact that, in my opinion, they seem to raise important theoretical 
questions and explore their narrative implications. At the same time, I discuss three theses by Jacques 
Derrida—on amnesia and finitude, the exteriority of the archive, and the eruption of amnesia, 
respectively—that, although indirectly, seem to respond to the films. Juxtaposing filmic narratives and 
philosophical arguments, I do not intend to offer a complete analysis of the films or to scrutinise the 
consequences of some Derridean passages. On the contrary, I seek to better understand some ways in 
which the limits of visual or textual discourses on amnesia are conceptualised; more simply, I try to 
offer some indices on what can (and, thus, has been) said on amnesia. 
 
Amnesia, Elsewhere 
 
Jean-Pierre Jeunet’s film Un long dimanche de fiançailles, based on Stéphane Japrisot’s identically 
entitled novel, tells the story of Mathilde, a young disabled woman attempting to find out what 
happened to her fiancé Manech, who was a soldier on the Franco-German front during World War I. 
Despite the fact that Manech has been declared dead, Mathilde gathers information both from state 
archives and from people who were present the day Manech and four other soldiers were sentenced to 
death for self-mutilation. Mathilde remains zealously focused on the events of that day (Hurcombe 
88) and she loses herself in a labyrinth of testimonies, each of which refers to a situation in which not 
even a person’s name is reliable. One of the five soldiers, called “That Man,” informs her: “I can 
promise you this, a name signifies nothing. Mine was given to me by chance. I took someone else’s 
name by chance” (Sherman 327). Even though Mathilde seems to be unaware of the political 
repercussions of her actions, she destabilises the official version of the events, which “did not so much 
repair a deficient history as [they produced] a historical fixation” (Shapiro 129). In her tireless effort 
to discover the truth, she moves to several places around France and makes extensive use of her quasi 
deconstructive skills; in that sense, the film “is a reflection on the ways in which the trauma of war 
effects the dispersal, substitution, and identification of bodies and words […] in a cryptic terrain at 
once psychic and geographical, at once individual and national” (Goulet 181). 
 
At the end of the film, this trajectory brings Mathilde to the amnesiac Manech who, totally 
unconscious of what has been going on around him for several years after the end of the war, is shown 
to be quietly living in an atmosphere of euphoria. Amnesia has almost enabled his rebirth (Jeannelle 
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108-109): Manech has found a new mother, the widow Desrochelles, and started living the life of her 
son who was lost during the war. What is more, “Manech triggers the events of the film but is unable 
to recall his actions (he appears to be the only character in the film who does not recall what happened 
during the war). The implication […] is that traumatic memory is not compatible with survival” (Ezra 
113). The paradoxical principle of simultaneous event-making and escape through amnesia is perfectly 
respected by Mathilde, when she takes the crucial decision to follow That Man’s advice and, instead of 
burdening Manech with painful memories, concentrates on creating new ones with him. She keeps the 
painstakingly assembled “prosthetic memory” to herself (Ezra 115) and the spectator is left to believe 
that, in a rather voluntaristic move, the couple will “set out together in a new relationship not defined 
by the past, but, through Mathilde’s narrative, in partial awareness of it” (Hurcombe 93). On the one 
hand, memory is laboriously reconstructed against all odds, despite anonymity and pseudonymity, 
drawing on the meticulous interpretation of a large amount of hidden or encrypted information. On 
the other hand, amnesia is recognised not only as the reason for the separation and the root of the 
problem, but also as a source of relief, as a condition both respected and kept at bay, thus exploited as 
a tool without being entirely integrated into the future to which it is conducive. By establishing a clear-
cut distinction between memory and amnesia, Mathilde (who undertakes the entire responsibility of 
re-membering) and Manech (who enjoys the innocence of complete detachment) seem to maintain 
amnesia as a mechanism for perpetually inventing possible futures. What is the meaning of these two 
distinct roles? Where exactly does a quest for something hidden in and by amnesia stop? How could 
Mathilde’s and Manech’s relationship to amnesia be justified? Could it be described in terms of 
relative continuity or absolute discontinuity between the amnesiac and the non-amnesiac? Or is it 
better conceivable as a relationship of clear-cut interiority and exteriority vis-à-vis amnesia itself? 
More generally, how could this peculiar dialectic be theorised? 
 
Speculating on the possible meanings of the phrase “life.after.theory,” Derrida says that “the word 
‘after’ may move around a double meaning: ‘after’ as in coming after, or ‘post;’ and ‘after’ in the sense 
of ‘according to’ – d’après … following without following” (9). Derrida pursues this double possibility 
by discussing the idea that “after” means being consistent with what is left, or with what is over, and 
by laying special emphasis on continuity with and fidelity to something past that is expected to be 
explained. This kind of fidelity is also inextricably bound to a form of betrayal, because “if I just 
repeat, if I interpret ‘following’ as just repetition, following in a way, in a mechanical way, just 
repeating, not animating, it’s another way of betraying” (10). Hence, repeating as an act of fidelity can 
only obliquely reiterate what has already been pronounced, because, quite predictably, it talks about—
and even around— instead of plainly retelling what it has to say. At the same time, repeating 
something excludes what is in line to be articulated a propos of it, although it announces what lies 
beyond the already said. One’s finitude is the very condition of this ambiguity between fidelity and 
betrayal, because an infinite being would not need to prove its fidelity to anything, for the simple 
reason that it would include everything and could forget nothing. A passage from “Following Theory” 
reads:  
 
As for […] the problem of finitude, well, it is because we are finite beings that forgetting, or distraction is 
irreducible in a certain way; but it is also because of finitude that we need oath and fidelity – it is precisely 
because there is this amnesia, this possible, always possible destruction or amnesia. Otherwise we 
wouldn’t need oaths and fidelity. This means that finitude produces at the same time both the possibility 
of evil – that is, destruction, amnesia and infidelity- and the urge for fidelity. It is the same system. An 
infinite being cannot forget, and for that very reason doesn’t have to promise anything. The promise itself 
attests to the fact that we are finite, that we may forget; which means that the possibility of evil is part of 
the opposite – again acoluthia and anacoluthon. (17) 
 
The possibility, or rather the danger, of amnesia is irreducible because of our (as well as Mathilde and 
Manech’s) finitude, while the most efficient antidote seems to be the oath, that is to say, a statement 
both confirming and exorcising the imminent arrival of amnesia: ‘I don’t forget,’ or ‘I will not forget,’ 
or even ‘I should not forget,’ ‘I promise not to forget,’ and maybe ‘I cannot forget.’ Such performatives 
place the object of potential amnesia within our finitude with the purpose of protecting it and 
guaranteeing or at least prolonging our fidelity to it; in a way, this is reflected in Mathilde’s trajectory. 
In a slightly different sense, they extend our finitude by increasing its capacity for memorising and 
finally remembering, but without being able to transform it into a quasi infinitude. When it comes to 
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what lies beyond this finitude, Derrida plays with a number of terms: “distraction,” “destruction,” 
“amnesia,” and “infidelity.” Trespassing the finis mei is an un-focusing diversion, an un-settling 
dismantlement, an anti-mnemonic gesture with an ethical dimension: all three are different versions 
of the “possibility of evil” and, almost mechanistically, result in “the urge for fidelity.” In that sense, if 
one is to talk about the evil of amnesia, one has to participate in what lies beyond him/her just as 
Mathilde tried to do with Manech’s life at the front, while the consequent lack of assurance justifies 
the very need for fidelity to himself/herself. More simply, one has to save himself/herself first and 
then reflect on amnesia to which one should never succumb. Interestingly, the relationship between 
one’s finitude and amnesia recalls the roles of Mathilde and Manech: this relationship seems to be one 
of violent rupture between the one who remembers and the one who does not, which, in my view, is 
closer to the anacoluthon. At the same time, there is no clear-cut mutual definition of the two, as the 
one who remembers can only de-naturalise, reconsider and finally remember his/her very 
remembering in the view of the other’s amnesia; and this might be said to establish a kind of 
acoluthia. 
 
One interpretation of this schema maps onto what could be described as the ‘conventional’ Derridean 
notion of impossibility: given that amnesia is situated both at the edge and well beyond one’s finitude, 
its study would be simultaneously liminal as well as impossible. Amnesia would be approachable to 
the extent that it is disconcerting yet contingent upon one’s own experience. Βut it would also remain 
undecipherable to the extent that it can be remedied neither by an oath nor by a promise; according to 
this approach, amnesia could only be part of an undesired evil. Nonetheless, I think that another 
interpretation, differentiating amnesia from the usual Derridean impossibility, might be more 
plausible here. While concepts like “gift,” “decision,” and “hospitality” are rigorously impossible, yet 
thinkable in a lighter ‘possible’ version and to a certain extent political, the very thinkability of 
amnesia is subject to a self-fulfilling assumption (an oath or a promise not to forget) which keeps 
amnesia away. Discursively as well as conceptually, amnesia does not circulate within philosophy’s 
common currency: one might understand hospitality or decision through a compromise (the everyday 
and ‘empirical’ notion of hospitality or decision), but one should only keep away from the very 
amnesia that one has to grasp. In other words, any conceptualisation of amnesia’s constitutive finitude 
always runs the risk of being transformed into a version or instance of a supposedly total forgetting 
which is untroubled and untroubling, and, once exported into the political realm, bears little 
resemblance to amnesia as such. But if amnesia is something to be avoided, it is also something to be 
observed, expressed and perhaps supplemented; if no empathy with it is desirable, allowed or 
achievable, the most appropriate way to approach amnesia might be via a speculative gaze. It is no 
coincidence, therefore, that when Mathilde and Manech finally meet, the voiceover draws the viewer’s 
attention to the fact that Mathilde “looks at him. Looks at him. Looks at him.” Staring at amnesia, thus 
both contemplating about it and keeping it away, is a powerless and inquisitive gesture; it is perhaps 
the most one can do either about or with it without compromising it and without surrendering to a 
lotus-eating complacency with a weakened version of it, namely without turning it into ‘ordinary’ 
forgetting. 
 
The Amnesia of the Non-archivable 
 
Gabriel Le Bomin’s Les fragments d’Antonin is another French film that deals with World War I. It 
does so through the story of Antonin Verset, a French soldier who served as homing pigeons carrier 
and had an affair with a military nurse called Madeleine. The film moves back and forth from 
Antonin’s experience at the front to his life in a psychiatric hospital as a patient suffering from shell 
shock. When Antonin is found, he can only repeat five names but is unable to make any connections 
between them or mould them in any narrative whatsoever. On several occasions, he compulsively 
repeats a number of movements he had either made or experienced in his previous life, such as 
touching the pigeons, wiping from his face the blood of a fellow soldier, and Madeleine’s caress on his 
face. Antonin is under the care of Professor Labrousse, a military doctor who methodically stimulates 
reactions from him (for example, by repeating the drum sound announcing an execution), films him 
and systematically comments on his case in private discussions as well as during seminar sessions. 
According to Labrousse’s diagnosis, which is repeated at least twice in the film, “Antonin Verset is far 
from an amnesiac. On the contrary, his memories are very precise. He experiences them like a 
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physical reality. His body is marked by gestures gathering the images of the past.” In exactly the same 
way, Antonin is re-living “the physical reality of the battle” and his memory is “coagulated on what the 
war made him live, like ghosts he cannot get rid of.” Antonin’s therapy aims to reshape his fragmented 
and displaced memory and thus enable him to reintegrate his experience into the present, appease his 
corporeal symptoms and make peace with himself (François-Denève 187-88). 
 
The character of Labrousse remains slightly ambiguous throughout the film: he oscillates between the 
loving care of a father and the curiosity of a scientist working on a topic by means of experimentation. 
In a way, Labrousse tries both to unpack Antonin’s case and to perpetuate his condition so as to 
achieve an understanding that is as thorough as possible. It is exactly in this context that he even 
questions the hypothesis that Antonin is suffering from amnesia: in this specific case, amnesia is 
localised and analysed, screened and watched rather than experienced, but it is also denied and 
remains unuttered as such. Antonin’s movements literally duplicate experiences of his past life, but 
they also remain to a large extent illegible. In a way, his memories take on a solid corporeal form that 
prevents him from acquiring new ones and it is as though Antonin suffers from amnesia of the living 
present. Instead of retrieving his past from a distance, Antonin has become identical to his own 
archive of not so haphazardly chosen names and gestures. In so doing, Antonin fails to maintain some 
exteriority vis-à-vis his depository of memories and, both immediately and cryptically, he offers 
everything he has managed to keep salvaged. In a way, he is engulfed in his past while his therapy 
aims to provide him with some space for amnesia or, at least, some helpful forgetting. It is only at the 
very end of the film, when Antonin recognises Madeleine’s touch taking place here and now, that his 
fixed past is dissociated from his lived present and both of them become, once again, archivable. 
Consequently, it is exactly at this point that Antonin’s atypical amnesia is smoothened into 
unsystematic remembering and disorderly forgetting. By placing particular emphasis on some clinical 
aspects of Antonin’s case, Les fragments d’Antonin tackle the question of the archive. To be more 
precise, the film shows that a specific type or usage of the archive intersects with amnesia. I could 
summarise some of the broader issues raised by the film as follows: Does archiving take place against 
amnesia? Is amnesia a demarcation of the non-archivable? Could amnesia coexist with the archive in 
any way? Is Antonin’s incorporation of the archive an example of the passage from amnesia to archive 
and vice-versa? 
 
I think that some answers to these questions are given by the very relevant reflection that recurs in 
Derrida’s Archive Fever, where amnesia is said to be the extinction not only of memory as mneme or 
as anamnesis, but also of the archive, which is “consignation, the documentary or monumental 
apparatus as hypomnema, mnemotechnical supplement or representative, auxiliary or memorandum” 
(11). According to this rationale and like Antonin’s movements, the archive is both irreplaceable as 
such and external to memory, a kind of add-on which precedes memory, makes it possible and keeps 
away from it. Nonetheless, the archive cannot be easily defined just as Antonin’s reactions to 
Labrousse’s experiments could not be straightforwardly decoded. Perhaps, and only to a certain 
extent, the definition of the archive can be achieved through its opposition to the experience of 
memory. Derrida says that: 
 
the archive, if this word or this figure can be stabilized so as to take on a signification, will never be either 
memory or anamnesis as spontaneous, alive and internal experience. On the contrary: the archive takes 
place at the place of originary and structural breakdown of the said memory. There is no archive without a 
place of consignation, without a technique of repetition, and without a certain exteriority. No archive 
without outside. (Archive 11) 
 
In that sense, the archive is not so much an experience of memory as what emerges when memory 
collapses and is no longer retrievable. What is more, if the archive is hypomnesic, it is thanks to its 
secondary and ancillary nature that it brings memory about or, as happens in Antonin’s case, 
promises the advent of memory. It is not situated at the centre of memory, but somewhere next to it, 
on the side, and apart from it; if memory itself is a kind of recurrence or reiteration presupposing the 
function of the archive, then “there is no archive without consignation in an external place which 
assures the possibility of memorization, of repetition, of reproduction, or of reimpression” (Archive 
11). Unlike what happens with Antonin, the so-called “structural breakdown of the said memory” takes 
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place outside the space that will be filled by the memory itself, in the anteroom where the very 
possibility of memory is decided. Derrida reminds us that, according to Freud, repetition is closely 
related to the death drive and, hence, to an always imminent destruction (11). Furthermore, the 
archive attempts to repeat the by definition unrepeatable event (something that is particularly clear in 
Antonin’s case) and is distortedly repeated itself as soon as it is memorised. That is the reason why 
“right on that which permits and conditions archivisation, we will never find anything other than that 
which exposes to destruction, and in truth menaces with destruction […]. The archive always works, a 
priori, against itself” (11-12). Hence, it is a self-destructive archive that, on the one hand, guarantees 
memory and, on the other hand, carries amnesia within itself. 
 
An amnesia imminent and immanent in the archive can only be different from and more complex 
than the simple omission of the unavailable material. Moreover, an archive prone to its own 
destruction is probably not an archive incapable of repeating, something which brings us back to the 
incommensurability between the event and the trace or the testimony (Chare, Bailey and Kilroy 2-16); 
it is not an archive which is unlikely to be repeated either, despite, for example, the programmatic 
calls for a historiography attentive to the rhetoric through which it treats this archive (LaCapra 36-
43). On the contrary, it is mainly an archive that tends to repeat its own exteriority vis-à-vis the 
subjects of memory and forgetting, even when an amnesiac like Antonin literally incorporates it. The 
trouble with the archive would not reside in what it has forgotten or excluded—thus in the material 
that is still waiting to be archived—but in the degree to which the archive can include what was up to 
now non-archivable, precisely because it was inconceivable as achievable. Although it might seem that 
the amnesia incited by such an archive resides in its yet unopened drawer, in the promise made by the 
archive, or even in the announcement that there is an archive to be explored, I tend to think that this 
remains a case of quasi-amnesia that is obliterated every time the archive is explored in more depth. 
What concerns amnesia, at least to a certain extent, is what doesn’t fit in the archive; and the archive 
points, always a posteriori, to an ex-amnesia which has to be thought of. As happens in Antonin’s 
case, amnesia becomes intelligible the moment it ends and only as the advent of the totally unknown 
which has also been, until then, unknowable. Amnesia, in short, might be the breakdown of memory, 
but it becomes comprehensible the very moment it is pointed out as such—or, perhaps, touched by (a) 
Madeleine—and is hence prone to its own breakdown.  
 
Erupting Amnesia 
 
Christopher Nolan’s Memento is perhaps the most emblematic film of the last decade dealing with 
amnesia. It proceeds in reverse order and traces “the impossible backward look of the historian from 
text to referent” (Thomas 204). The main character, Leonard Shelby, suffers from anterograde 
amnesia and is incapable of absorbing new information after his wife’s death. Convinced that she was 
murdered by two men and that one of them managed to escape (neither of which is proven in the 
film), Leonard seeks revenge. Therefore, he takes full responsibility for his actions (Smith 44; Bragues 
74-75), starts collecting and combining information and develops a sophisticated, yet ultimately 
unreliable, method of maintaining direct access to it: he uses polaroids on which he takes notes in 
order to remind himself who is who and what action to take, and he tattoos information of vital 
importance on his body. For the purposes of my argument, I will briefly refer to three elements of the 
film. 
 
First, at a certain point Leonard talks about amnesia (about “his condition,” as he usually says) with 
the receptionist of his motel: “What’s it like? / Like waking. Like you always just woke up. / That must 
suck. All backwards… Well, like you got a pretty good idea of what you’re gonna do next, but no idea 
what you just did. I’m the exact opposite” (Whitehouse 335). This short dialogue offers an elementary 
yet pertinent definition of amnesia: involuntarily turning away from the past, orienting oneself 
exclusively towards the future, and enabling oneself to realize this future with no other limitations 
apart from amnesia itself. The second element concerns one of the flashbacks of the film, where 
Leonard talks to his wife while she is trying to read the same well-worn paperback once more: “How 
can you read that again? / It’s good. / You’ve read it a hundred times. / I enjoy it. / Yeah, but the 
pleasure of a book is in wanting to know what happens next. / Don’t be a prick. I’m not reading it to 
annoy you, I enjoy it. Just let me read, please.” Quite obviously, Leonard’s wife has withdrawn to “a 
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duration of recurrent narrative pleasure apart from the local surprises of plot and climax” (Garrett 
132) as opposed to Leonard’s perception of what is interesting and what is not. But this withdrawal is 
not without its own kind of deliberate and partial amnesia, one that encourages a re-reading and 
remains unaffected by a given beginning or end, or a kind of rediscovery which is not bound to the 
linearity of storytelling. For Leonard’s wife, this re-reading is a persistent re-petition, the reading of an 
“as if something had not taken place already,” and eventually a re-discovery or a voracious re-
consumption of what survives consumption; for Leonard himself, the same re-reading can only lead to 
or work through the same text. Third, Leonard depends on malleable testimonies like commented 
photographs and tattooed reminders. His point of reference is what his vision has once captured and 
what he has considered to be important enough to be put on his body; interestingly, one of the tattoos 
reads “Memory is treachery” (Little 72-73). However, contrary to what happens in Les fragments 
d’Antonin, amnesia is negotiated on the surface of Leonard’s body: outside him, unassimilated, 
undigested and unabsorbed, it takes on the form of an archive condemned to be misused and to 
remain forever incapable of finding its place in Leonard’s memory. Those elements constitute a maze 
based on the “randomization of temporal tenses” and on “a sort of ‘no rules’ space leading inescapably 
to contrivance” (Lyons 128). Leonard obsessively and hopelessly tries to navigate it, but the absence of 
a filtering and structuring force does not allow him to build a trustworthy interpretation, which is why 
Memento constantly oscillates between a process of archivisation as crystallising constellation and 
repetitive delirious reconstructions of the past. 
 
In sum, Leonard can only envision a deracinated future; he can only bear a new plot even though he is 
destined to reread the one that he can only provisionally put together and keeps raking through the 
flares of a memory in the—impossible—becoming. Besides that, if Leonard is desperately looking for 
his lost capacity to put his traumatic autobiography into words, he does not manage to properly spell 
it out as reliable history. Instead of a coherent and convincing narrative, it is his amnesia that 
continuously erupts, becomes a major impediment to his will to recount his story appropriately and, 
after all, prevents him from articulating anything else than his amnesia. In a word, amnesia leaves 
little space to discourses other than its own. Exactly like the first two films I referred to in this paper, 
Memento raises a number of crucial questions: How can amnesia itself speak? What will its topic be? 
If “memory is a treachery,” what would amnesia’s truth look like? Would an amnesiac discourse give 
place to the autobiography of what is not yet lived? 
 
I think that, in an oblique way, Memento invokes what Derrida attempts to do in Monolingualism of 
the Other, where he gives an account of his childhood in Algeria in terms of a double interdiction: 
access to non-French languages was impossible and access to French was denied to him in an 
“apparently roundabout, and perverted manner” (31). The specific timing of his Jewishness 
condemned him to a kind of aphasia, or, to be more precise, of induced self-silencing reminiscent of 
Lenard’s incapacity to talk about his past. The absence of a legitimate thus speakable mother tongue 
made memoirs literally unspeakable and autobiography almost inconceivable. While Leonard Shelby 
was in need of a past, Derrida was short of a language that would enable him to put it into words. 
Despite this difference, however, the crucial question for Derrida seems to apply to both cases: “how 
does one utter a worthwhile ‘I recall’ when it is necessary to invent both one’s language and one’s ‘I’, to 
invent them at the same time, beyond this surging wave of amnesia that the double interdict has 
unleashed?” (Monolingualism 31) The absence of a serviceable language, of a pronounceable past, or 
of an operative subject attests to the emergence of a hardly imaginable amnesia which is nowhere 
close to a state of helpless apathy and in no way equivalent to a tacit erasure of things past. Leonard 
Shelby zealously reconstructs his narrative, while Derrida insists on the description of amnesia as an 
“unleashed, surging wave” (a déferlement in French, as he insists reminding his readers),  
 
for it is suitable here to think of tensions and the play of forces, of the jealous, vindictive, and hidden 
physis, of the generative fury of this repression – and that is why this amnesia remains, in a way, active, 
dynamic, powerful, something other than a mere forgetfulness. The interdiction is not negative; it does not 
incite simply to loss. Nor is the amnesia it organizes from the depths, in the night of the abyss, incited to 
perdition. It ebbs and flows like a wave that sweeps everything along upon shores that I know too well. It 
carries everything, the sea, and on two sides; it swells, sweeps along, and enriches itself with everything, 
carries away, brings back, deports and becomes swollen again with what it has dragged away. 
(Monolingualism 31) 
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In that sense, amnesia can have a table rase effect on the already known (Leonard Shelby’s 
professional and personal past, Derrida’s Algeria), but it can also mingle with it after having removed 
it. This amnesia is the emergence of a void which nevertheless remains one’s void, different from a 
tabula rasa, a void presupposing one’s finitude, touching upon and longing for one’s limits 
(something like the moment of the murder in Memento), namely what Derrida calls the “shores that I 
know too well.” Amnesia looks like a wave that comes and goes, moves and replaces, destabilises and 
starts afresh, manages things without totally wiping them out, and at the same time makes a 
newcomer out of the old. In a way, it profits from the “generative fury of this repression” and proceeds 
to a repetitive, yet sometimes radical, re-seeing. This kind of amnesia is perhaps neither irresistible 
nor inevitable. It may be soothed through narration or historicisation, and it is no coincidence that 
Leonard Shelby’s revenge presupposes both of them. But, according to Derrida, this would be the 
work of someone else for two reasons: “because I carry the negative heritage, if I may say so, of this 
amnesia, which I never had the courage, the strength, and the means to resist, and because an original 
historian’s work would be necessary, of which I have felt myself incapable” (Monolingualism 53). In 
that sense, amnesia is remediable through the labor of historiography, but, more than anything else, it 
can be a kind of tempting heritage which enhances one’s urge to speak his/her idiom: “the break with 
tradition, uprooting, the inaccessibility of histories, amnesia, indecipherability, and so on: all of these 
unleash the genealogical drive, the desire of the idiom, the compulsive impulse to anamnesis, and the 
deconstructive love of the interdict” (59), that is to say, the urge to face amnesia through one’s 
unexpectedly owned discourse. At the same time, while these factors intersect to produce a 
“pathological destructing, growing disintegration: a madness” (59) like Leonard Shelby’s, which 
sounds like an altogether threatening possibility, they nonetheless allow one to speak in a different 
way, or even in a still unheard language, which is neither one’s own nor attributable to someone else. 
Leonard’s repetitive interpretations and Derrida’s fear of madness converge in that they long for their 
unachievable narratives, but they finally produce a number of eccentric non-historiographies by 
talking against their respective amnesias – and perhaps also thanks to them.  
 
The final scene of Un long dimanche de fiançailles is marked by Mathilde’s relieved, exploratory and 
ultimately powerless gaze at Manech: “She looks at him. Looks at him. Looks at him.” In Les 
fragments d’ Antonin, Labrousse films his patient and studies the living archive that Antonin has 
become over and over again. Memento’s Leonard can either stare at the polaroids which summarise 
his world in a series of photographic snapshots or read, often through a mirror, the tattoos he has put 
on his body. In all three cases, amnesia is a mostly unreadable spectacle or a helpless watching: a 
visible mystery beyond the interpreter’s limits, a corporeal and resistant archive, or the reading of an 
intricate photo-thriller capable of evoking innumerable speculations. Life stories are open to 
conjecture, narratives are fundamentally unreliable, and complex or even contradictory discourses are 
enunciated. One of my basic concerns in this paper was to think on the specific regime of discourses 
on amnesia and, more precisely, on their peculiar and uncertain impossibility. In my effort to tackle 
this issue, I read three films and some passages from Derrida and came up with some theses regarding 
what can be said both about and as a result of amnesia: the hard core of amnesia is ultimately 
inaccessible and impenetrable by discourse; amnesia becomes knowable only following its breakdown 
through archivisation; amnesia triggers the eruption of a new and hitherto unpredictable discourse. In 
light of these statements, I will conclude with one last passage from Circumfession (Bennington & 
Derrida), Derrida’s idiosyncratic autobiography that serves as a response to Geoffrey Bennington’s 
account of the philosopher’s work and might also be seen as a text that escapes from the double 
interdiction described earlier in Monolingualism of the Other. In the sixth paragraph, the text reads: 
 
I would be trying, against him [i.e. G.B.], that would be my rule here, my law for the duration of these few 
pages, to reinscribe, reinvent, obliging the other, and first of all G., to recognize it, to pronounce it, no 
more than that, to call me finally beyond the owner’s tour he has just done, forgetting me on the pretext of 
understanding me, and it is as if I were trying to oblige him to recognize me and come out of this amnesia 
of me which resembles my mother while I say to myself when I read this matrix there’s the survivress 
signing in my place and if it is right, and it is, faultless, not only will I no longer sign but I will never have 
signed. (33) 
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Understanding is here the pretext for performing some kind of amnesia, namely not an amnesia of 
something distant and unimaginable, but an amnesia of the very substance one is trying to engage 
with and contemplate on. To be more precise, understanding can only be the memory of what was 
conceived of, even if only imperfectly, and it can also point to its own imperfection and to the urgent 
need for its own completion. It would implicitly serve as a proof for the possibility of such a 
completion and as a promise of another, this time impeccable, understanding. Even so, understanding 
turns out to be amnesiac vis-à-vis what remained unintelligible or was unintentionally ignored. This 
kind of amnesia can only be healed through a subversive hermeneutics and an entirely alternative 
interpretive counter-discourse that will achieve the understanding that the initial discourse was 
longing for, in an utterly defamiliarising and misappropriating way (“to call me finally beyond the 
owner’s tour he has just done”). This discourse would be so unanticipated and so illuminating that 
only amnesia could describe its state before it comes into being. Even more so, articulating a counter-
discourse that deserves the status once assigned to amnesia, in other words, seeing or inventing 
amnesia a posteriori, would be the most demanding critical task, a kind of survival never expected 
and surprisingly erupting. Like Derrida’s amnesiac mother who was progressively unable to recognise 
her son, the counter-discourse both exposing and cancelling amnesia should recognise the old as 
totally new. Or, perhaps, like Manech’s initial and final question addressed to Mathilde (“Does it hurt 
when you walk?”), this counter-discourse will always ask questions about the fundamental, the 
obvious and the painful and receive answers which recall nothing, even though it has gone through an 
incredible labyrinth of suspicions, traces, cross-readings, hypotheses, and errancies. 
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